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THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
WILLIAM B. GOULD*
We have temporized too long with the passport practices of the
State Department. Iron curtains have no place in a free world.'
The right to travel has been deeply enmeshed in the Anglo-Amer-
ican tradition. In the relatively small country of England this need
was particularly obvious, and there can be little doubt that both
England and the United States owe a great deal of their commercial
and intellectual growth to the freedom of international mobility.2
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Articulating a reaction against royal abuse, clause 41 of the Magna
Carta guaranteed to instrument merchants "safe and secure exit from
England, and entry to England, with the right to tarry there and to
move about as well by land as by water."13 Clause 42 extended corre-
sponding rights to the remainder of society. It permitted the individual
"to leave our Kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and
water, except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of public
policy. .. ." Subsequent re-issues dropped clause 42 and thus the
only explicit guarantee related to the merchants in clause 41. The
concern for the right of locomotion, however, was present in early
England. Professor Jaffe noted this when he wrote the following:
When it is remembered that many of the "civil liberties" as we
know them today-the "freedoms" of speech, worship and as-
sembly-are not mentioned in Magna Carta, it is curious that it
contains a chapter on freedom of travel.4
The writ, ne exeat 'regno, became the king's restrictive weaponry
in this area, but by the sixteenth century it was in a state of gradual
decline and eventually came to be applied only to absconding debtors.,
The values envisaged in freedom of movement were inscribed in
American tradition from the very beginnings of independence. Article
IV of the Articles of Confederation stated that "the people of each
state shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other
states... ." This right was later upheld by the Supreme Court in a
* Assistant General Counsel, United Automobile Workers, AFL-CIO.
1. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissent).
2. A detailed history is contained in Note, Passports and Freedom of Travel:
The Conflict of a Right and a Privilege, 41 Geo. L.J. 63 (1952).
3. This paper is concerned primarily with the right to leave a country, and not
to enter. Thus the snarls of immigration are avoided or at least dealt with only
indirectly.
4. Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 Foreign Affairs 17,
19 (1956).
5. Note, supra note 2.
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number of decisions.6 Some writers have stated that the travel
between states is an entirely different question from that of travel
beyond our frontiers,7 but the viewpoint of the district court for the
District of Columbia seems to be a better one. It wrote as follows:
While the Supreme Court was there [in the above mentioned
decisions] considering freedom to move from state to state within
the United States, it is difficult to see where, in principle, freedom
to travel outside the United States is any less an attribute of
personal liberty. Especially is this true today, when modern
transportation has made all the world easily accessible and when
the executive and legislative departments of our government have
encouraged a welding together of nations and free intercourse
of citizens with those of other friendly countries.8
The Constitution makes no mention of the right to travel. Since
there was no discussion of this matter in the debates of the con-
stitutional convention, it has been maintained that such liberty was
viewed as an "unchallenged right," and something that was assumed
rather than rejected.10 The almost complete absence of regulation in
this area until 1856 indicates that this proposition has merit. Those
who argue that the courts may not approach this question as a
"right" because the Constitution does not speak of it specifically are
in for many constitutional surprises. Indeed, Professor Black, in his
excellent work, The People and the Court, has recently pointed out
that all provisions of the Constitution are "neither self-enforcing
nor self-construing."1
6. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S.
270 (1900); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
7. Note, Passport Control in the National Interest and Freedom to Travel,
33 Temp. L.Q. 332 (1960).
8. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952).
9. Freedom To Travel, Report of the Special Committee to Study Passport
Procedures of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, at 5 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Freedom To Travel].
10. Professor Jaffe writes that "it has that powerful yet ambiguous confirma-
tion which comes from a custom which is taken for granted and upon which so
many of the 'rights' and 'freedoms' of Englishmen rest." Jaffe, supra note 4 at 20.
11. Black, The People and the Court 140 (1960). Language itself can hardly
ever be completely self-construing. Whenever an implicit right is found in a
document a great hue and cry will go up and many will argue that the Pandora's
box has been opened. See the following conversation in Passport Legislation
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
49 (1959):
Senator Lausche. I am asking this because of your ability as a lawyer:
the right to travel is not guaranteed in any specific language in the Con-
stitution. Now, on what theory was the deduction made that the right to
travel is a constitutional right?
Senator Javits. Well, I think that.., either you agree or disagree with
their fundamental construction of the Constitution. Liberty of movement,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/2
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Passports were recognized as early as 1803 when American consuls
were forbidden by statute to issue them to non-citizens. -12 Historically,
a passport has been considered to be a document whereby a citizen
could conveniently identify himself to foreign officials so as to have
the courtesies to which he is entitled as a citizen.
During the War of 1812 passports became a requirement for travel
into enemy territory.13 In 1835 the Supreme Court wrote that "there
is no law of the United States, in any manner regulating the issuing
of passports, or directing upon what evidence it may be done, or
declaring their legal effect. ' ' 14 With the passage of time, however, a
great deal of confusion arose because of the practice of governors,
mayors and notaries public (in addition to the federal authority) of
issuing passports. It was to deal with this problem and to reduce
the possibility of fraud that Congress centralized the issuance of
passports in 1856 with the following act:
That the Secretary of State shall be authorized to grant and
issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and
verified in foreign countries by such diplomatic or consular of-
ficers of the United States, and under such rules as the President
shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United
States, and no other person shall grant, issue or verify any such
passport .... 15
Violation in issuing passports was forbidden by penalty.
In 1866 a substantive amendment disqualified non-citizens.10 The
Revised Statutes of 1875 changed the statute so as to read, "The
which is what they, in essence, decided, is one of the fundamental and in-
herent rights of any citizen under the Constitution....
Senator Lausche. We would be justified, in a measure, to believe that
there are other rights, not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, that
would fall into the same category as the right to travel.
12. Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 9, § 8, 2 Stat. 205. As to the original nature
of the passport, see Freedom To Travel at 18-19, wherein the following is written:
The word "passport" is based on two French words, passer, to pass, and
port, a port or harbor. Originally, the passport concept involved govern-
mental permission to enter or leave a port or harbor, and it was gradually
extended to include generally permission of egress and of passage. Thus,
it is not surprising to find that passports were first issued to foreigners
as permits to travel into and through the issuing nation; and in international
law passports came to be recognized as letters of protection or of safe
conduct issued by the host country.
13. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 10, 3 Stat. 199.
14. Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835).
15. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 60. By Act of June 14, 1902,
ch. 1088, 32 Stat. 386, the law was amended to disqualify persons not owing
allegiance to the United States. This amendment was meant to cover citizens
of Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines.
16. Act of May 30, 1866, ch. 102, 14 Stat. 54.
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Secretary of State may grant and issue passports." This replaced
the previous provision which provided that, "The Secretary of State
shall be authorized to grant and issue passports." This remains as
the basic enabling statute for the Secretary of State, and, although
the language is "may" rather than "shall," the effect would appear
to be the same.1 7
In 1918 Congress enacted a statute which would operate during
time of war.1 8 The act prohibited departure from or entry to the
United States during wartime or upon a presidential finding of
necessity by proclamation. 9 The statute became operative through
a proclamation by President Wilson in 1918.20 When the war was
officially declared at an end by statute, the passport requirement was
terminated.21
The authority conferred on the President by statute was exercised
in 1938 by Franklin D. Roosevelt through an Executive Order.22
This order designated only one general category with regard to
passport eligibility-citizens of the United States. The order also
enunciated formal requirements for passport application, evidence for
citizenship and authorization for the Secretary of State to use discre-
tion in the issuance of passports and to make regulations. On the
same day as the President's order, the Secretary did issue implement-
ing regulations of a procedural nature.2 3 Subsequently, on June 21,
1941, the 1918 act was amended to become operative in time of war
or proclamation of national emergency.24 In the same year a presi-
dential proclamation made this amendment operative,25 and it re-
mained so until 1952.26 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
repealed the 1918 act, but retained similar provisions requiring pass-
ports for foreign travel "when the United States is at war or during
the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the Presi-
dent .... ,,27 President Truman issued such a proclamation in 1953,
17. See Judge Bazelon's dissent in Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 582 n.16
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
18. Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559.
19. The penalty for violation was a maximum of twenty years imprisonment,
or a fine of $10,000 or both.
20. Proclamation No. 1473, 1918 Foreign Relations 809 (Supp. 2).
21. Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.
22. Executive Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 799 (1938).
23. Departmental Order 749, 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.101-.134 (1938).
24. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252. The penalty for violation
was reduced to a maximum of $5,000 fine, or five years imprisonment or both.
25. Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941).
26. Between 1945 and 1951 travel was "relatively free" except in areas under
military control. See Freedom To Travel at 9.
27. 66 Stat. 190, 279 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
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thus making the statute operative.28 Both proclamation and statute
remain in effect today, and as a result the passport is a requirement
for travel outside the Western Hemisphere.
In 1952 the Secretary of State issued regulations imposing sub-
stantive passport qualifications which excluded Communist support-
ers.2 9 The main previous substantive disqualification, existing in
peacetime, and where a passport was a necessity to travel, was that
of citizenship. Much controversy has surrounded these regulations,
and they will be returned to shortly.
The Internal Security Act of 195030 also deals with the passport
problem. Section 6 makes it a crime for a member of a Communist
organization to apply for or use a passport. It should be noted that
there is some variance between this statute's provision and the
Secretary of State's regulations. The former does not indulge in the
arduous task of defining those who are going abroad to aid the
Communist movement or those who follow a certain "line." State
Department regulations would appear to go beyond the Internal
Security Act and attempt to deal not only with Communist Party
members, but also with those individuals who are subject to Party
"discipline."131
28. Proclamation No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953).
29. Departmental Order 749, 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1952), states:
Limitations on issuance of passports to persons supporting Communist
movement. In order to promote the national interest by assuring that
persons who support the world Communist movement of which the Com-
munist Party is an integral unit may not, through use of United States
passports, further the purposes of that movement, no passport, except one
limited for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be
issued to:
(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have
recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to
warrant the conclusion-not otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they
continue to act in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of
the Communist Party;
(b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the
Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist
movement under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion-not
otherwise rebutted by the evidence-that they have engaged in such activi-
ties as a result of direction, domination, or control exercised over them by
the Communist movement;
(c) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the
Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance
of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which
will advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and
willfully of advancing that movement.
30. 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958).
31. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 47, 63
(1956).
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Area restrictions involve another question where travel has been
restricted by the Secretary of State.3 2 Prohibitions have usually been
imposed where hostilities were in progress, but there have been ex-
ceptions. A contemporary and glaring exception is that of Communist
China.33 Passports were valid for all countries for a number of years
prior to World War I; subsequent to peace, restrictions were relaxed
as to all of the Central Powers except Germany, Austria and Russia.
Soon thereafter passports were valid everywhere. When Mussolini
invaded Ethiopia in 1935, travel to that country was eliminated,
except for recognized representatives of American newspapers, press
associations, magazines, motion-picture companies and well-known
independent writers. The same exceptions applied to a restraint on
travel to Spain at the outset of the Civil War in 1936. More restric-
tions ensued as World War II grew near, and with the United States'
entry, travel was limited to the Western Hemisphere (except for ac-
credited war correspondents). On December 3, 1945, passports be-
came valid for travel anywhere except occupied enemy territory.
This restriction was gradually withdrawn.
The State Department, on May 1, 1952, announced a new policy.
Passports were to be stamped as not valid for Russia, China and
Eastern European countries, but at the same time travel was not
forbidden to these countries. In 1955 Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Rumania and Russia were opened to travel, but visits to
Albania, Bulgaria and those portions of China, Korea and Viet Nam
under Communist control were forbidden. This policy evoked the
real beginning of the contemporary discussion of area restrictions.
II. RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE?
The individual's quest for a passport depends very much on how
society will characterize it. If his petition is accorded the status of
privilege, he may find his path strewn with impediments. It then
becomes quite difficult to speak of violation of either procedural or
substantive due process. But if his petition can be viewed as a
right, the state assumes the burden of proof when it seeks to deprive
the individual of this right. The Eisenhower administration's at-
titude is reflected in the following exchange between Congressman
Bentley and the Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs:
Mr. Bentley.... Do you regard the possession of a passport
as a privilege or right?
32. Freedom To Travel at 14-18.
33. The most recent of such restrictions deals with Cuba. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1961, p. 1, col. 4.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/2
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Mr. Hanes. I regard the possession of a passport as a priv-
ilege.34
The considerable dissent from that opinion stems from the sight
of all-pervading governmental control in an area where the citizen
must always beseech the state for permission. The need for strict
legal protection may be especially present when, as here, the Govern-
ment restricts human movement because of the possible injury to
national security or foreign affairs. Indeed, Mr. Justice Jackson has
written that,
the most scrupulous observance of due process, including the
right to know a charge, to be confronted by the accuser, to
cross-examine informers and to produce evidence in one's behalf,
is especially necessary where the occasion of detention is fear
of future misconduct, rather than crimes committed. 5
Certainly when the Government involves itself in the business of
dispensing gratuities it has an obligation to be fair to the public.
This is especially true where the Government makes it unlawful to
proceed without such a gratuity-which is the case with passports.
Parenthetically, it might be noted that the courts have often given
legal protection to what they have persisted in calling a "privilege."30
Professor Davis finds three ideas, and a fourth method, upon which
the courts have relied in recognizing an interest for the petitioner:
(1) that constitutional principles of substantive and procedural
fairness apply even when a privilege is at stake and even when the
privilege itself is not directly entitled to legal protection; (2)
that privileges as well as rights are entitled to legal protection;
(3) that when a privilege is combined with another interest the
combination may be a right and accordingly entitled to legal protec-
tion; and (4) a practice of illogically providing legal protection to
a privilege without mentioning that it is a privilege.
One need not attempt such reasoning in the passport area, how-
ever, for "the theory of privilege or lack of right.., became unreal
as the nature of a passport changed. The passport came to be usually
indispensable to foreign travel."37 In any event the matter seems to
be fairly well settled by the federal judiciary.
34. Hearings on H.R. 9069 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1959), providing standards for the issuance of passports
and other purposes.
35. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 225 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
36. Davis, The Requirements of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
225 (1956).
37. Id. at 260. See also Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional
Issues and Judicial Review, 61 Yale L.J. 171, 189 (1952), wherein the following
is written:
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The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rec-
ognized the substantive right to travel in Schachtman v. Dulles.38
Judge Fahy probably went beyond the position of many right-to-
travel advocates when he spoke of it as a "natural right." Noting
the illegality of travel without a passport and the impossibility of
entering certain countries without a passport,39 he wrote the fol-
lowing:
The denial of a passport accordingly causes a deprivation of
liberty that a citizen otherwise would have. The right to travel,
to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit,
is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable
regulation under law. A restraint imposed by the Government of
the United States upon this liberty, therefore, must conform with
the provision of the Fifth Amendment that "No person shall be
... deprived of... liberty... without due process of law." 40
Remaining doubts as to judicial recognition of this right were
obliterated in 1958 by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Kent v. Dulles.4' Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, took
a look at the history of travel in this country and stated that "the
right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot
be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
ment. '42 He relied on Professor Chafee's writings on the history
of freedom to travel43 and the social benefits to be derived therefrom,
as he said,
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and
inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel
abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for
In like cases involving use of the mails, courts realized that an activity
which was long considered a privilege may be given increased judicial pro-
tection because of its greater importance under changed conditions. Similarly
new conditions have given greatly increased importance to passports.
38. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see Note, 41 Cornell L.Q. 282 (1956);
Comment, The Passport Puzzle, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 260 (1956); Comment, Au-
thority of the Secretary of State to Deny Passports, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 454
(1958).
39. Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial
Review, 61 Yale L.J. 171 (1952).
40. Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955). (Emphasis
added.)
41. 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 77, 172 (1958); 57 Mich. L. Rev. 119 (1958).
42. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
43. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, 171-81 (1956).
A similar attitude may be found in The Saturday Review, Jan. 11, 1958, What's
Wrong with U.S. Passport Policy?, p. 10; see also, Welch, A Citizen Criticizes,
id. at 10; Commager, A Nation of Travelers, id. at 24.
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livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the
choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement
is basic in our scheme of values. 44
Although the Court avoided discussing the limitations that might be
imposed upon the right to travel, it has made clear that this freedom
is an "important aspect" of liberty.
A subsidiary question centers about a discussion of the constitu-
tional provision to be exercised in the protection of this right. Justice
Douglas, in the Kent case, relied upon the fifth amendment, but some
writers look to the first amendment, and it has been argued that the
source of the right depends upon the purpose of a trip.
The right travel could be treated as a facet of free expression
and communication under the First Amendment, the threat of
passport denial for political reasons being treated as a prior
restraint on free speech. Such an analysis, while more difficult
to reach than the Fifth Amendment approach actually adopted,
would make possible use of the "clear and present danger" rule
as an overriding limitation. Under the analysis chosen there are
no established guideposts since the Fifth Amendment merely
requires that due process be accorded. This problem will un-
doubtedly cause the Court some vexation in the future.45
Congressman Lindsay has maintained that the right to travel
should find its source primarily in the first amendment. 4 He reasons
that,
speech is communication, and communication this modern day
is impossible without locomotion. Speech is meaningless un-
less thought of in the context of the physical and social aspects
of human existence. The social aspect suggests that speech is
not effectively exercised when a man talks to himself-speech
implies communication. The physical aspect renders communica-
tion impossible under some circumstances-or possible only
through certain means. The social aspect may in turn attach
connotations to the physically possible means, rendering all but
one appropriate. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the interaction of these aspects in its interpretation of free speech
and has held that denial of the appropriate means of communica-
tion may abridge free speech.47
44. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
45. 57 Mich. L. Rev. 119, 120-21 (1958).
46. See Passport Legislation Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1959), which contains the following:
Senator Lausche .... On what provisions of the Constitution do you
primarily rely in proving that the right to travel is a constitutional right?
Mr. Lindsay. The first amendment.
Senator Lausche. That is the right of freedom of speech?
Mr. Lindsay. Correct.
47. Communication from Congressman Lindsay to the author, Nov. 2, 1960.
In this regard see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), wherein the Supreme
Court characterized the picketing of a certain area as free speech.
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The American Civil Liberties Union has taken much the same
position. They view this freedom as an integral element of the first
amendment. 4 Denial of this right is thus analogous to the stifling
of beliefs, the thwarting of associations and the obstruction of the
press."9 This is a viewpoint which this writer thinks has plausibility,
especially when travel is meant to produce information. These values
are inherent in the first amendment.
Despite the rights that inure to the citizen attempting to travel,
it has been argued that the judicial inquiry into this matter should
be a narrow one. This practice might well make the individual's
protection more apparent than real. If we allow this right to be
"narrowly construed ... [it can] afford no real protection." 50 Why,
then, should the judicial inquiry be restricted? The Secretary of
State has argued that the passport problem is part of the Govern-
ment's conduct of foreign affairs and the power to be exercised in
this realm is exclusively vested in the executive. But this implicit
power has been recognized only with regard to negotiations with
foreign governments.51 This authority has not
involved a situation where the Executive action was specifically
directed at restraining the freedom of a particular individual.
Nor, in any of those cases, were there charges that unconstitu-
tional considerations affected the Executive determination or
that procedural due process had been denied. The validity of
restrictions on the freedom of movement of particular individ-
uals, both substantively and procedurally, is precisely the sort of
matter that is the peculiar domain of the courts.52
III. PASSPORT DENIAL LITIGATION
Since the subject of this paper lies within the peculiar domain of
the courts, it is important to discover judicial experience in this
area. 3 This is a sine qua non for any discussion of improvements
and alterations.
48. Hearings on S. 2770, 3998, 4110, 25.4137 Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1958).
49. The ACLU finds, alternatively, the freedom to travel in the ninth and
tenth amendments. The ninth amendment says that the enumeration of certain
rights in the Constitution shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people. The tenth amendment says that powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution or prohibited by it to the states, are re-
served to the states or to the people. See Hearings, supra note 48.
50. Black, The People and the Court 99 (1960).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
52. Note, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and
Judicial Review, 61 Yale L.J. 171, 187 (1952); see Judge Bazelon's dissent in
Brieh v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), for the citations of foreign
affairs cases.
53. The cases are compiled in the Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at v (1957).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The first of a series of cases in the passport field was Bauer V.
Acheson."' This was an action against the Secretary of State for a
declaratory judgment, for review under the Administrative Pro-
cedural Act,55 and for an injunction against denial of the plaintiff's
right to a passport. It arose from a revocation by the State Depart-
ment of plaintiff's passport without notice or hearing. The only
reason given for revocation was the Secretary's opinion that "her
activities are contrary to the best interests of the United States."
Plaintiff contended, among other things, that the revocation and
refusal to renew her passport without hearing or notification was
violative of the fifth amendment's due process clause. The Secretary
answered that the issuance and revocation of passports were within
the "absolute discretion" of the executive branch because of: (1)
its inherent power in foreign affairs, and (2) the passport statute.
Conceding the passport problem to be within the conduct of foreign
affairs and thus according "wide discretion," the district court never-
theless recognized the existence of constitutional limitations on the
activities of political departments. The court, viewing travel as a
personal liberty, stated that passports were not to be administered
arbitrarily or capriciously. The opinion made no suggestion that the
Secretary was without power to act in this realm. The court simply
wrote that "since the Act in question is susceptible of an interpreta-
tion which would permit due process, it follows that it is not in
violation of the Fifth Amendment."' " The Secretary was directed
to either renew petitioner's passport or grant her a hearing.
Subsequently the petitioner dropped the case, but shortly after the
decision the State Department issued regulations which established
the Board of Passport Appeals and devised criteria for passport
denidls. Not only did the rules disqualify those who would "advance"
or "support" the Communist movement,57 but they also denied cer-
tain information to the applicant upon which the Board might base
its ruling and denied confrontation of adverse witnesses.8
In Dulles v. Nathan,59 Judge Edgerton considered the case of Otto
Nathan, economics professor and executor of Albert Einstein's will.
Proceedings began on December 24, 1952 when Nathan applied for
a passport. His application remained pending for nearly twenty
54. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
55. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952); Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1952), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. iv, 1957).
56. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 452 (D.D.C. 1952).
57. 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1952).
58. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.163, 51.170 (1954).
59. 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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months until finally he sought a declaratory judgment and injunction
to direct the Secretary to issue his passport. The district court
directed the Secretary to give plaintiff a prompt and appropriate
hearing.60 Because of noncompliance with this order the Secretary
was subsequently directed to issue a passport to the plaintiff. This
petition was an appeal by the Secretary.
The circuit court held that Nathan was entitled to a "quasi-judicial"
hearing because he had never been accorded an evidentiary hearing
and had not been confronted with evidence. The court ordered an
almost immediate hearing with report and recommendation to be
based on the record. The State Department dropped the case and
issued the passport.
Boudin v. Dulles- was a case that also involved procedural due
process. The Secretary of State had refused to issue a passport to
petitioner on the basis of "evidence," some of which was contained
in confidential reports. Petitioner sued in district court for a judg-
ment that he, as an American citizen, was entitled to a passport, and
that the passport regulations were invalid. He also sought an order
for the issuance of his passport. The district court held that Boudin's
right to a quasi-judicial hearing must include the right to confront
adverse testimony and to cross-examine so as to rebut or explain.
Confidential information was characterized as a hindrance to judicial
review. The case was remanded to the Passport Office.62
Both the Secretary and Boudin appealed this decision. The Sec-
retary subsequently submitted an affidavit to the circuit court
which stated that Boudin's associations and activities led to the
conclusion that he was a supporter of the Communist movement.
The circuit court, however, dismissed this affidavit from consideration
because it failed to state that Communist direction was exercised
over him, therefore failing to state a conclusion or finding under the
regulations. The court returned this matter to the Secretary with
directions for reconsideration. If the Secretary should continue to
deny Boudin's passport, he was to advise Boudin, in writing, with or
without additional hearing, of the findings made and relate them to
60. Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951, 952 (D.D.C. 1955):
The record in the case and stipulations of counsel leave the facts fairly clear
and from them I can reach only one conclusion which is that the plaintiff
did not have a hearing which the law contemplates and guarantees. I do
not suggest the form or the manner in which such a hearing should be held
but there should be one. It does not satisfy me to argue that the plaintiff
has not exhausted his administrative remedies since I think as a matter of
practical fact he had none.
Accord, Clark v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 956 (D.D.C. 1955).
61. 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
62. Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955).
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the sections of the regulations relied on. The court also said the
following:
We do not reach in the present posture of the case the contention
made by Boudin that the Secretary cannot rely on confidential
information in reaching his decision. But since that question may
arise at a subsequent stage, we think the Secretary should-if
he refuses a passport to Boudin after the further consideration
we have ordered-state whether his findings are based on the
evidence openly produced, or (in whole or in material part) on
secret information not disclosed to the applicant. If the latter,
the Secretary should explain with such particularity as in hisjudgment the circumstances permit the nature of the reasons
why such information may not be disclosed .... This will facili-
tate the task of the courts in dealing with the question of the
propriety of the Secretary's use of confidential information-a
question which, we repeat, we do not now reach.03
Subsequently, the State Department issued a passport to Boudin.
It thereby rendered this case moot and postponed the day of judg-
ment on confidential information.
'Schactman v. Dulles64 raised an issue of substantive due process.
Here Max Schachtman, chairman of the Independent Socialist League,
was denied a passport because that organization was listed by the
Attorney General as a subversive group. Schachtman had previously
testified that his organization was in opposition to revolutionary
violence and was committed to the democratic process. Nevertheless,
the State Department declined to issue a passport to him on the
grounds that it would not be in the best interests of the United
States. Schachtman did not seek to compel the Secretary to issue a
passport. He only asked that the grounds for rejection be declared
insufficient.
The circuit court upheld this petition (reversing the district
court) and held that the Secretary's denial was arbitary. A passport
was then issued to Schachtman. It would be difficult to conceive of a
more clear cut case supporting the proposition that travel bans
have been a weapon exercised against "Americans whose views on
domestic and foreign policy do not accord with those of the State
Department.'"
63. Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
64. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see also, Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840
(D.C. Cir. 1956). Here the Secretary of State disqualified petitioner on the basis
of a means test. Since this policy did not seem to be applied to the great majority
of other applicants, the circuit court set aside the Secretary's ruling because of a
failure to establish a reasonable classification, thus making his action arbitrary.
The court commented that application of a means test would raise serious con-
stitutional questions. See Judge Prettyman's dissent.
65. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 47 (1956);
see also, Boudin, The Right to Travel, The Nation, July 30, 1955, p. 95; Parker,
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Kent v. Dulles66 was the first of the passport cases to reach the
Supreme Court. This case incorporated two appeals from the circuit
court into one. Rockwell Kent, an artist, was informed by the
director of passports that issuance of a passport to him was precluded
by the regulations because it was alleged: (1) that he was a Com-
munist, and (2) that he had a consistent and prolonged adherence to
the Communist Party line. Kent was advised of his right to an
informal hearing, but he was told that whether or not the hearing
was requested, it would be necessary for him to submit an affidavit
as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist. Kent did
not ask for a hearing, but rather for a new passport application,
listing several European countries he desired to visit. When ad-
vised that a hearing was still available, his attorney replied that Kent
took the position that the affidavit requirement was unlawful, and for
that reason and as a matter of conscience he could not support such a
procedure. Nevertheless, an informal hearing was held at which the
principal evidence against him was his book, It's Me 0 Lord. Kent
conceded that the evidence was accurate and refused to submit a
sworn statement dealing with Communist front affiliations. Because
of a subsequent passport denial based upon his non-compliance, Kent
sued in district court for a declaratory judgment and an injunction.
The district court viewed the Secretary's regulations as reasonable
and the circuit court affirmed.
Another case with a similar fact situation involved Dr. Walter
Briehl, a psychiatrist who sought a passport in order to attend
conferences in Geneva and Istanbul. He also refused to give an
affidavit about Communist Party membership. Briehl asked for a
hearing and was given one. He contended that: (1) political affilia-
tions were irrelevant to a passport; (2) every American has the
right to travel regardless of politics; and (3) the burden rested upon
State Department shoulders to demonstrate that he had engaged in
illegal activity. The Department refused to issue a passport to
Briehl.
Briehl filed a civil action in district court.67 He sought a judgment
which would declare, among other things, that he was entitled to
a passport, and that the passport regulations were invalid. The
district court denied the relief sought, and the circuit court affirmed.
Judge Prettyman, speaking for the majority, wrote: "The Communist
organization and program have long since passed beyond the area
The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40 Va. L. Rev. 853
(1954).
66. 248 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1957). For another passport case decided by the
circuit court at that time, see Stewart v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
67. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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of mere politics and political opinion."' ' G He took judicial notice of
Congressional and Presidential declarations on this topic and stated
that the court would not be "naive," and that the courts should not in-
terfere in executive foreign affairs, "save in a narrow and limited class
of extraordinary circumstances."6 9 In summation, he viewed the regu-
lations as reasonable and recognized the State Department's duty
to prevent incidents abroad which might provoke hostility, stating,
"And so the problem in the case is once more the familiar problem of
balancing private right against public requirement. Our conclusion
is reached by such a balancing. '70
Judge Bazelon dissented, with Judges Edgerton and Fahy con-
curring in his dissent. He perceived the Secretary's substantive regu-
lations to be invalid because: (1) the President did not delegate
such discretion; and (2) the President did not have such discretion
himself. Judge Bazelon noted that the authority conferred upon the
President had been understood to be procedural-with the exception
of the substantive requirement of citizenship.71 In rejecting the
Secretary's urging to recognize implicit discretion in the statute,
Judge Bazelon added that to do so would raise grave constitutional
doubts. He left no doubt that he would be particularly vigilant when
he wrote, "the word 'Communist' is not an incantation subverting at
a stroke our Constitution and all our cherished liberties."T2
While the dissent did recognize that the Secretary's power to
curtail travel might extend beyond its present limits, it saw no
implication in the express language of the statute which justified the
regulations at issue.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court accepted Judge
68. Id. at 565.
69. Id. at 568.
70. Id. at 573. This balancing act, which is invariably applied in a manner
hostile to the individual's rights, is stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951), as follows:
Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not
legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to
reconcile competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance
they strike is a judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected
unless outside the pale of fair judgment.
71. For passport problems involving American citizenship, see Perkins v. Elg,
307 U.S. 325 (1939); Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835); Louie
Hoy Gay v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1957); Dulles v. Tam Suey Jin, 237
F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1956); Dulles v. Quan Yoke Fong, 237 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.
1956) ; Yip Mie Jork v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Yung Jin Teung v.
Dulles, 229 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1956); Chin Chuck Ming v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 849
(9th Cir. 1955); Hitaka Suda v. Dulles, 224 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1955); Jew May
Lune v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1955); Ng Kwock Gee v. Dulles, 221 F.2d
942 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388 (8th Cir. 1923).
72. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Washington University Open Scholarship
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Bazelon's reasoning and held that Congress had not delegated the
discretion claimed by the Secretary of State.3 Justice Douglas,
writing the majority opinion, spoke for Chief Justice Warren,
Justices Black, Brennan and Frankfurter.74  He scanned passport
history and found, generally, two previously existing reasons for
denial: (1) lack of citizenship; and (2) violation of U.S. laws:
We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952
it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its
issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to
give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport
from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose.75
Declaring war powers to be a different matter, the Court said that
power delegated to regulate liberty must be carefully scrutinized, 7
stressing the fact that beliefs, associations and ideological matters
were involved in the right to travel. In avoiding constitutional
questions, the Court said in conclusion:
To repeat, we deal here with a constitutional right of the
citizen, a right which we must assume Congress will be faithful
to respect. We would be faced with important constitutional
questions were we to hold that Congress by § 1185 and § 211a had
given the Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens
because of their beliefs or associations. Congress has made no
such provision in explicit terms; and absent one, the Secretary
may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right of
free movement.77
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Burton, Harlan and Whitaker
dissented. Their view of legislative intent was in sharp contrast with
that of the majority78 Although they also claimed to avoid the
73. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Previously the Supreme Court had
denied certiorari where a citizen refused to sign a similar affidavit. See Robeson
v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 895 (1956). Here
suit was dismissed because petitioner had not exhausted his administrative reme-
dies-including the execution of such an affidavit.
74. It is doubtful that the Court avoided constitutional issues and used this
approach so as to have Mr. Justice Frankfurter's vote. Judge Bazelon used the
delegation theory when such considerations were not present.
75. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958).
76. The failure-to-delegate approach is relatively unusual. See Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). But a constitutional issue will always be
avoided if possible. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Wes-
tinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
77. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958); accord, Dayton v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 144 (1958).
78. Although a conclusion acceptable to the dissent may be drawn from the
1918 legislative history, nevertheless "legislative history of the 1926 statute gives
no indication as to whether Congress intended to confer power on the Secretary
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constitutionality of the Secretary's regulations, they stated that,
realistically speaking, we were not at peace and thus emergency
measures to deal with a conspiracy might well be appropriate to
a national security program.
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board"9 has recently upheld the validity of the Internal
Security Act as applied to the Communist Party. The constitutionality
of a blanket prohibition against the Communist Party is extremely
doubtful when one considers the Court's attitude as exhibited in Kent.
Previous decisions indicate that the Court will insist on more
restrictive criteria-perhaps a differentiation between "active" Party
members and mere ideologists. At this time, it appears as if the
State Department is acting on a case to case basis. Proposals for
enforcing the Court's decision are now being considered.8'
Recent cases involving passport procedures arise from the State
Department restrictions on travel in "those portions of China, Korea
and Viet Nam under Communist control. '8 2
Worthy v. Herter83 is the first of a trilogy of cases dealing with
individuals who seek to travel to Communist China. In this case,
William Worthy, a duly accredited newspaperman, applied in 1957
for his passport. The passport contained restrictions against travel
in Hungary and portions of China, Korea and Viet Nam under
Communist control. Worthy declined to commit himself to obedience
of these restrictions and consequently renewal was refused. The
background for this refusal consisted of Worthy's previous travel in
Communist China and Hungary in the teeth of the same restrictions.
Judge Prettyman, speaking for the circuit court, was quick to point
out that this case in "no wise" resembled the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Kent v. Dulles:
In the case at bar no beliefs, associations, or personal charac-
teristics are involved. Nor is this a case in which the Secretary
has proposed a restriction upon a passport for reasons of internal
security, i.e., protection against internal subversion. The factors
here are political and military conditions in certain areas of the
earth.8 4
to prescribe substantive eligibility requirements for a passport or whether it
merely intended to confer power to establish appropriate procedures for the issu-
ances of passports." Authority of the Secretary of State to Deny Passports, 106
U. Pa. L. Rev. 454, 460 (1958).
79. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
80. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957) ; see also Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 111 (1961).
81. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 17.
82. See Gelhorn, American Rights 148-49 (1960).
83. 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
84. Id. at 907.
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The court recognized that a constitutional right to travel was at
issue along with the freedom of the press.85 However, these rights,
like all others, are not absolute. The court reasoned, "Liberty is
achieved by rules, which correlate every man's actions to every other
man's rights and thus, by mutual restrictions one upon the other,
achieve a result of relative freedom." 86
Judge Prettyman said that he found no restrictions upon Worthy's
thinking and writing. He noted the Secretary's claim that restricted
areas were "trouble spots" where American citizens might be placed
in danger and where American foreign policy might be impeded.
For the judiciary to interfere would be usurpative. He viewed the
Secretary's action as within the Executive power to conduct foreign
affairs, reasoning as follows:
If the Secretary has any discretion it seems to us it must include
a discretion to prevent trouble when he reasonably foresees
trouble. Without a preventive discretion, he has no discretion
of any realistic content.8 7
Frank v. Herter-s and Porter v. Herter89 involved travel in Com-
munist China. The circuit court dealt with them similarly. The
only wrinkle in those cases is the different occupations that were
urged as reasons to travel-scholar and Congressman. All three cases
have been denied certiorari by the Supreme CourtY' However, a
denial of certiorari "is not a precedent for like action in a similar
case... ,"91 and this issue may well crop up again soon. It deserves
some scrutiny.
Judge Prettyman says that the question of travel to restricted
areas in "no wise" resembles Kent v. Dulles. But is this really true?
The Supreme Court in Kent said that historically in peacetime the
Secretary had only exercised substantive power with regard to
citizenship and offenders of United States laws. Travel restrictions
in peacetime, like denials of passports for political beliefs, are of
recent origin. The passport statute does not confer authority upon
the Secretary to abridge the constitutional right to travel. Not only
do these cases resemble Kent very much, but they are also conceptually
difficult to distinguish. Why should we now impute to Congress an
85. There is the additional question of equal protection caused by the Secre-
tary's imprimatur being placed upon the travel rights of some newspapermen. See
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 21-25, Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
86. Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
87. Id. at 912.
88. 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
89. 278 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
90. Worthy v. Herter, 361 U.S. 918 (1959); Frank v. Herter, 361 U.S. 918
(1959); Porter v. Herter, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
91. Stern and Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 149-50 (2d ed. 1954).
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intention to suddenly abridge this right with new-found substantive
regulations?
Of course the cases are different in one sense-and admittedly it
is a major sense. The Executive here, in the conduct of foreign
affairs, is presumably dealing in the area of negotiations with foreign
governments. This is the factor which makes the foregin affairs
argument more plausible than in Kent. In this area travel might more
arguably be subject to "reasonable regulation" 2 to avoid impairment
of this Executive function.
There is only one caveat to the above-stated Executive claim. It is
the lack of explicit authority in the Constitution empowering the
Executive to act in this manner. Inherent Executive power has been
accepted warily by the judiciary, even when argued for on the basis
of military hostilities. 93 The Supreme Court, in Kent, said that any
new regulation of the liberty to travel should come from Congress."
It is very possible that action to the contrary "flies in the face of the
Constitutional tradition accepted by .. . [the] Court. ..
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A number of legislative proposals on the passport problem were
placed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 86th
Congress," but "no action was taken on this subject by the Committee
because of the wide divergence of opinion."97 This problem is one
which will undoubtedly occupy a good deal of the committee's time in
the eighty-seventh Congress. 8 Congress should enact legislation in
the passport area because of: (1) the desirability of definite procedu-
ral standards in preference to previously existing State Department
fiat; (2) the doubt which now surrounds the validity of Executive
action in the promulgation of area restrictions; and (3) the sub-
92. See Comment, The Passport Puzzle, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 260, 289 (1956).
93. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
94. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). The Eisenhower Administration
cast doubt on their belief in this power when they asked for legislation in accord
with the Worthy decision. Senator Fulbright believes that there is doubt about
this authority. See Passport Legislation Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1959).
95. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, Porter v. Herter, 361 U.S. 918 (1959). The
proposed bill stated that "it is not clear at present whether the Department
actually has such power under existing law." Passport Legislation Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1959).
96. For a comparison of the bills see Passport Legislation Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-33 (1959).
97. Communication from Senator Fulbright to the author, Dec. 13, 1960.
98. Communication from Senator Fulbright to Secretary of State Herter, Sept.
20, 1960.
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stantive vacuum created by the Supreme Court's decision in Kent.
It is appropriate that this task be undertaken by Congress, for, as
Judge Bazelon has said:
The broad power to curtail the movements of citizens of the
United States, to the extent that our Government possesses it,
is vested in Congress, not in the President. . . . Whether our
internal security requires the drastic measure of restricting
travel and, if so, to what extent and by what criteria and pro-
cedures is for Congress to decide. If and when Congress acts,
there will presumably be hearings, reports and debates which
may serve to limit what Congress elects to do and may help to
interpret what it does. The constitutionality of any such measure
will, of course, depend on its provisions and the circumstances
in which it is enacted.99
All nations, irrespective of strength, must impose security measures
in the basic interest of self-preservation. Our laws must not give
comfort to those who commit crimes and to those who are actively
engaged in a dedicated struggle to overthrow the government. In-
ternal security is a competing interest in a free society. -
It is true that we are, at present, involved in the "cold war" with
the Communist bloc-a struggle that may prove to be lengthy and
exhausting. But just how germane is this struggle (a struggle that
exists in peaceful coexistence) to the problems of internal security
and passport procedures? It becomes important for the American
citizen to ask what passport procedures have to do with internal
security. If the nation has a goodly number of hard core con-
spirators, it would seem that they would not find a passport to be
an item of necessity. Surely they could make a fruitful use of other
methods of communication such as the mails, cables and telephones.
And might they not find embassies and consulates located in this
country convenient to their plotting? Furthermore, under existing
law, a conspirator who felt dire need to confront his fellow conspir-
ators face to face beyond United States limits could do so. A passport
is not required for travel in the Western Hemisphere-and travel to
Iron Curtain countries may often be arranged from other countries
in this hemisphere. 00
The whole question requires at least a brief discussion of internal
security itself in this country at present. The ability of the most
dedicated opponents of our government to effectuate physical harm
here is extremely doubtful. The United States is an advanced in-
dustrial society in the midst of a fair amount of stabilizing opulence.
It is in an era where appeals to a violent Communism not only fall
upon deaf ears, but are a simple anachronism. Congress would do
99. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 596 (D. C. Cir. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
100. Freedom To Travel at 43.
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better to legislate a bill containing wisdom in its respect for freedom
-a concept which finds its essential roots in a concern for the benefit
of society-and constitutional authenticity in its recognition of a
right specifically enunciated by the Supreme Court.
In considering passport legislation Congress ought to be mindful
of one other factor. If there is a grave threat to our internal security,
and if there is a nexus between this and the issuance of passports, it
would seem that the effects of unbridled conspiracy would now be at
their height. Kent has obliged the State Department to stop refusing
passports to Communist supporters. Indeed the State Department
has announced that it has been reluctantly issuing passports to hard
core Communists' 0-- and this is a situation that has been in existence
now for almost three years!
It would be interesting to know of those catastrophes envisaged by
advocates of restrictive legislation and critics of the Supreme Court.
Those predicted efforts appear to have remained embryonic for three
years. Thoughtful Americans must be puzzled by this clouded area
of unanswered questions. Perhaps they are stating inquiries similar
to that posed by Senator Morse:
The President of the United States sent a special message to
Congress asking for restrictive passport legislation immediately
following the Supreme Court passport decisions. These fright-
ening words came from the President: "Each day and week that
passes without it [restrictive passport legislation] exposes us to
great danger !"
It is high time that the Government witnesses give us their
views on this subject. We are entitled to know what the "great
danger" is, if it actually exists.1 °2
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Six passport bills were introduced in the Senate in the 86th Con-
gress. 10 3 Three of these will here be considered. The bills to be discussed
were sponsored by Senators Humphrey,10 4 Fulbright,10 5 and Wiley'01
101. Brief, supra note 89 at 34.
102. O'Conner, Need for Legislation Authorizing Denial of Passports to Com-
munist Supporters, 39 Dep't State Bull. 880 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
103. The bills not discussed were introduced in 86th Cong., 1st Sess. by Senator
Javits (S. 1973), Senator Eastland (S. 1303) before the Internal Security Sub-
committee of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Mundt (S. 2095) before the
Government Operations Committee.
104. S. 806 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) [hereinafter cited as the Humphrey
bill].
105. S. 2287, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) [hereinafter cited as the Fulbright
bill].
106. S. 2315, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) [hereinafter cited as the Wiley bill].
A restrictive bill sponsored by Rep. Selden of Alabama, H.R. 9069, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959), passed the House on Sept. 8, 1959. No further action was taken.
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respectively. Only the Fulbright bill is a comprehensive treatment
of passport problems. These three bills were selected for analysis
because they represent what might be viewed as three basic positions
in this controversy. Also to be considered in this discussion of pro-
posals is the excellent book, Freedom to Travel, a work of the Special
Committee to Study Passport Procedures of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, and some recommendations presented
by the American Civil Liberties Union.
A. Prompt Notice
The Department of State has indicated that the average period
of time in 1957 between passport application and tentative disapproval
was seventy-two days.' 0 ' Since there are no statutory safeguards
in this area, it is important that some be effected by new legislation.
Delayed travel, like justice, may often result in complete frustration
for the restrained individual. Dr. Otto Nathan has testified that it
took two and one-half years of waiting before he was issued his
passport. 08 While admittedly the State Department has advanced
from a Star Chamber era, 0 9 it is proper that statutory obligations be
thrust upon it.
The Wiley bill recommends a ninety day waiting period. However,
the Humphrey and Fulbright bills state that the limit should be
thirty days. The Special Committee's"10 recommendations also contain
a thirty day provision. In the light of the frequent need to travel
promptly, it would seem that the latter recommendations should be
accepted by the Foreign Relations Committee.
The Special Committee thinks that the applicant should be in-
formed of reasons for denial so as to permit the possibility of "early
and economical" resolution of the problem. The Fulbright bill
contains similar objectives in its attempt to command specificity in
notice and to convey to the applicant an awareness of his rights,
and it would also require a written statement containing specific
reasons for denial. In addition, the State Department would furnish
detailed information upon which the stated reasons of denial were
based, and an identification of the sources of the information. Also
included would be detailed information concerning a petitioner's right
to administrative judicial review. The Humphrey bill is silent on
this point, and the Wiley bill would allow the statement of reasons
to be as specific as the dictates of national security permit.
107. Freedom To Travel at 75.
108. Freedom To Travel at 77.
109. Hennings, The Right to Travel, Coronet p. 133 (Dec. 1957).
110. Freedom To Travel at 35-90.
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Legislation should be along the lines drawn by the Committee and
Senator Fulbright.
B. Necessity for Hearing
Although there is no statutory requirement for a hearing, never-
theless, regulations of the Secretary of State establish such a pro-
cedure.:' Furthermore, a hearing procedure has received judicial
recognition in Nathan and Bauer.
The Special Committee has proposed that an individual denied
his passport be entitled to "a trial type hearing on the issues of fact
relative to denial of his passport.""12 They believe that the hearing
body is properly located within the Department of State. This is
because procedural regulations already provide the adequate safe-
guards for which an independent body might be created. The Special
Committee recommends that the Office of the Legal Adviser have
representation on the Board because of the legal nature of the pass-
port appeal. He would act independently as a member, as would
the other members. The Committee recommends that a counsel for
the State Department be appointed by the Secretary of State. His
role must be separate from that of the Board."' The applicant
would have the right to counsel. 14
The Fulbright bill is in substantial agreement with the Committee.
The provision for hearing would be thirty days, and would not
be extended to citizenship and area control cases.
Senator Humphrey would have a trial-type hearing as envisaged
in the Administrative Procedure Act.",' This suggestion the Special
Committee considers inappropriate. This act places the burden of
proof upon the proponent of a rule or order. It calls for a sanction to
be imposed "upon consideration of the whole records, . . ." or that
portion which may be cited by any party as "reliable, probative and
substantial evidence."116
The Wiley bill is similar to that of Senator Fulbright except that
the length of time allowed before a hearing must start is ninety days.
The Committee's proposals seem satisfactory, and they should be
enacted into law with Senator Fulbright's thirty day time period.
111. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.151-.170 (1958).
112. Freedom To Travel at 76.
113. Compare 22 C.F.R. § 51.153 (1958), with Freedom To Travel at 77.
114. Present regulations of the Board provide for appearance by or with an
attorney. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.160-.161 (1958); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
115. 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1952).
116. Ibid.
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C. Confrontation
The sixth amendment specifically guarantees the right to confront
witnesses in criminal cases. There are good reasons behind the right
to face one's accusers, for as Mr. Justice Douglas has said, the
faceless confidants,
may be psychopaths or venal people, like Titus Oates who revel
in being informers. They may bear old grudges. Under cross-
examination their stories might disappear like bubbles. Their
whispered confidences might turn out to be yarns conceived by
twisted minds or by people who, though sincere, have poor
faculties of observation and memory.117
The Fulbright bill would require full disclosure of evidence and
the complete right of cross-examination. It would appear that the
Humphrey bill is in agreement. Its reliance on the Administrative
Procedure Act is tempered with the exclusion of that Act's provisions
for withholding information detrimental to the national security.
Senator Wiley would withhold information, sources of information
and investigative methods where their disclosure would have a
substantially adverse effect upon national security or foreign rela-
tions. A "fair" resum6 would be given to the applicant.
The Committee split four to four on this question. Two of the
members who balked at full confrontation present an interesting
alternative.'" They make an exception to this principle in the
"extremely narrow and rare" situation. Where an applicant has had
access to government information of a highly classified nature, he
may be denied complete discovery and confrontation where such
denial is based on the charge that the applicant would disclose such
information abroad. The head of the appropriate investigative agency
certifies that discovery and confrontation would reveal intelligence
sources and techniques which would be detrimental to the national
security. Regular governmental classification would not be control-
ling, and the nature of the information would be re-examined by the
agency. These members of the committee stress that casual infor-
mants should not be protected. They also emphasize the high position
of trust accorded those with highly classified information and the
attendant obligations of that trust.
Although the requirements of the sixth amendment are only
applicable to criminal cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that merchant
seamen in administrative proceedings cannot be barred from pursuing
their occupation on the ground of subversion unless they have the
117. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 351 (1955) (concurring opinion).
118. Freedom To Travel at 84-86. The opinion is presented by Mr. Fifield
Workum and Mr. Adrian S. Fischer.
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right to full discovery.'" Due process has also been held to be
applicable to state employees in denial of employment cases.120 In
legislating in the area of travel, Congress ought to be mindful that
they are dealing with a right guaranteed by the Constitution. The
recommendations of Senators Fulbright and Humphrey are in accord
with the liberal procedures that are appropriate to this problem.
Such legislation might possibly include the above stated exception-
but Congress should proceed cautiously in carving out exceptions.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking of a situation where a constitutional
right was not at issue, said the following:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental
action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of
the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove
the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that
he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is
important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of indivi-
duals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be
perjurers or persons motivated by malice, . . . prejudice,. or
jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the require-
ments of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient
roots.12'
One further admonition to those who would seek to surround this
right with restrictions is implicit in the following statement by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter:
We can take judicial notice of the fact that in conspicuous in-
stances, not negligible in number, such "confidential information"
has turned out to be either baseless or false. There is no reason
to believe that only these conspicuous instances illustrate the
hazards inherent in taking action affecting the lives of fellow men
on the basis of such information. The probabilities are to the
contrary.22
D. Transcript of Hearings
In keeping with the right of full discovery, a complete record of
all testimony should be kept with copies available to the applicant, the
Secretary and the reviewing court if necessary. Both the Committee
and the Fulbright bills contain this provision.
119. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955); but see Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
120. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
121. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
122. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 373 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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E. Privacy of Hearings
The Committee has suggested that hearings should be private in
order to alleviate possible social and economic prejudice. This pro-
vision could be waived by the applicant if he desired a public hearing.
The Fulbright bill is similar.
F. Appeal from Administrative Hearing
The Committee has recommended that upon a favorable ruling by
the Board, a passport should be issued immediately. If the Board
denies the application, the Committee thinks that proposed findings
and facts should be submitted to the Secretary. If the Secretary
denied the passport, he would be required to issue his findings to the
applicant with specific reasons for rejection.
The Fulbright bill specifically incorporates the idea of ultimate
review by the Secretary. Senator Wiley would have the Board make
recommendations to the Secretary. Enactment of the Committee's
proposals would be desirable.
G. Judicial Review
At present, there is no specific provision providing for judicial
review; but such review has been obtainable in the United States
district courts in the District of Columbia. The standards of the
reviewing court are uncertain.
The Wiley bill provides that the district court in the District of
Columbia may determine whether or not the Secretary has complied
with the passport act and regulations. If this could be supported
by substantial evidence on the entire record, the Secretary would be
upheld. There is one caveat. A court would not be able to review a
passport denial based on information not in the open record or of a
confidential nature.
Enactment of the Humphrey bill would leave the existing state of
the law unchanged. Senator Fulbright has proposed that review
be sought in either the District of Columbia or in the district court
of the applicant's residence. The judiciary would determine whether
or not the Secretary had complied with the procedural and substantive
portions of the bill and regulations. The court would not sustain
denial of a passport unless the Secretary's findings were supported
by substantial evidence on the entire record.
Congress might take a long, hard look at possibilities for forum
shopping here, but a provision in accord with the spirit of the
Fulbright proposal should be enacted into law.
It should be pointed out to those who would deprecate the impor-
tance of rigid compliance with the above mentioned rules that:
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It is not without significance that most of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or
caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is
our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.123
H. Substantive Grounds for Denial of Passports
The Committee believes that neither membership nor support of
any organization, short of violation of the Smith Act, should serve
as criteria for travel restraints. A more definable danger to the
security of the United States should be contemplated. The Committee
stated that:
Travel of an individual should be restrained only upon a clear
showing of real danger to the nation which would follow from
the travel abroad of the particular applicant. The generalized
taint which properly attaches to the Communist Party as an
organization should not be carried over to restrain the travel
of an individual without evidence which specifically links the
individual to dangerous activity abroad.1 24
The Committee rejects the idea that qualification to travel should
be related to anything so vague as advancing the "Communist move-
ment." The Committee recognizes that this is a matter which is
susceptible to a variety of answers and thus difficult to administer.
They wrote the following:
Indeed, it is a rare administrator who would on his own initia-
tive resolve any doubt in favor of the applicant. The inevitable
tendency is to deal with rumor as fact, association as member-
ship, and advocacy as incitement. This discretionary power, in
sliort, is foreign to American standards of fairness and justice.121
It is the Committee's opinion that it would be more consistent with
our principles of freedom to allow freedom of travel to those sus-
pected of "leftist beliefs and associations." It is the Committee's
judgment that less harm will be done by the travel of those who are
severely critical of our government than would be done if many
could claim to be prisoners within our borders.
What then should the standards be for national security? The
Committee believes in restraints upon the following categories: (1)
individuals transmitting United States secrets; (2) individuals who
would incite hostilities which might involve the United States and
thus endanger our national security; and (3) individuals who would
123. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951).
124. Freedom To Travel at 42-43.
125. Id. at 43-44. See also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (1954),
affd 232 F.2d 334 (1955).
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incite attacks by force upon the United States. They would give the
State Department authority to predict such action as a court predicts
an anticipatory nuisance through injunction. But the Committee
emphasizes that predictions should be concerned with action and not
speech.
The Committee would also restrain the following people: (1) fugi-
tives from justice and persons under court restraining orders; (2)
persons repatriated at government expense, repayment not having
been made; (3) persons determined to be mentally ill by competent
authority; and (4) minors whose travel is objected to by one or both
parents. The Committee would not extend prohibitions to: (1)
persons likely to become public charges; or (2) habitual criminals
who have served their punishment.
Senator Fulbright would follow the criteria that the Committee
enunciated. Realizing that such criteria present a real problem of
investigatory channels, Senator Fulbright has, unlike the Committee,
discussed the role that membership in a political party will play. He
wrote that,
it would certainly be relevant to the national security criteria...
to inquire whether the applicant is, or within the past few years
has been, a member of the Communist Party... But it would
not permit the Department to inquire into party affiliations in the
1930's and 1940's, since in those days the nature of the Communist
threat was unknown to many loyal, law-abiding Americans and
since under the bill a passport may be denied only if its issuance
could create the likelihood of imminent danger to national secu-
rity. Nor would section 202 sanction inquiry into the activities
of applicants relating to so-called "left-wing" or "front" organi-
zations unless it can be shown that such an organization is
engaged in activities relating to the criteria. . . . My bill
focuses on conduct that presents clear and present danger to
the security of the United States and in no way attempts to curb
expression of unpopular beliefs or association with unpopular
groups.... I want to stress that the fact that section 202 permits
inquiry into current Communist membership does not mean that
a passport could be denied under section 203 (b) solely because
of such membership. 26
The Fulbright bill would also deny passports to: (1) individuals
charged with criminal felony violations or free on bail; (2) individ-
uals convicted within five years of violating area control regulations
and who fail to post $5,000 bond to guarantee future compliance; and
(3) persons repatriated at government expense, repayment not having
been made.
The Humphrey bill states that passports will not be issued to people
126. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong.,
lot Sess. 14 (1959).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
charged with or under sentence for a felony. During periods of
declared war the President would be empowered to deny a passport
for any reason.
The Wiley bill would keep the existing regulations. During the
remainder of the present national emergency, a passport could be
denied where there were substantial grounds for a belief that the
applicant knowingly engaged in activities to further the international
Communist movement. Petitioner would have the burden of proof
in proceeding before the Secretary of State. This provision's restric-
tiveness is undesirable in our free society today and stands convicted
of vagueness. Furthermore, its constitutionality is doubtful in view
of the Court's concern for freedom of belief in Kent.
The recommendations of the Committee and Senator Fulbright
are tempting. Their concern for action rather than beliefs, and
Senator Fulbright's limited inquiry into Communist membership
seem to be consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Yates 'V.
United States:
The distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and
advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action is one that has
been consistently recognized in the opinions of this Court .... 12,
The Fulbright bill proves especially alluring when one realizes that
the excellent procedural regulations in this bill would assure a mini-
mum of deviation from the Yates principle-as would the right to
judicial review.128 The bill provides a nexus between belief and
action which is rather clear. Nevertheless the inquiries provided for
seem to be unnecessary. The danger caused by people who would put
their beliefs into action, once abroad, appears to be negligble in view
of events since the Kent decision. As of now there have been no
violent physical attacks upon the government which can be traced
to the passport policy. Implicit in the Fulbright criteria is the
happening of events within a short period of time. It would be
difficult for the State Department to make long range predictions, and
indeed, such speculation would be inconsistent with the stated criteria.
The past three years have indicated that there is a dearth of con-
spirators who would cause violence immediately. In view of this, can
we consider the Fulbright inquiry to be justifiable?
The Humphrey provision on this subject seems to be the most
desirable law under present day conditions. Unless specific dire
consequences can be exhibited, it would be best to keep beliefs and
associations inviolate from all possible encroachments and adminis-
127. 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
128. For a statement in support of this bill, see communication from Professor
Bickel to Senator Fulbright, July 8, 1959, in Passport Legislation Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 160-61 (1959).
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trative discretion. The actual commission of a crime would be a better
standard here. The State Department should, of course, co-operate
with police authorities and would deny a passport in such situations.
But mere abstract intent to commit a crime is not a crime. If such
intent is accompanied by actual preparations, then the applicant
can be indicted for conspiracy.'2 It should be noted that the Fulbright
bill would repeal the Internal Security Act's passport provision. The
Humphrey bill leaves this legislation intact.130 That act's standards
of Communist Party membership are inferior to the standards of
both the Fulbright and Humphrey bills. Congressional action should
then repeal Section Six of the Internal Security Act. This writer's
other recommendation in this area would include all other categories
suggested by the Committee and Senator Fulbright which are not
inconsistent with the Humphrey bill. A restraint imposed upon
defendants in a civil action involving a substantial amount seems
reasonable. This has been advocated by the American Civil Liberties
Union.
I. Area Restrictions
It seems clear that the President could constitutionally prohibit
travel in certain areas pursuant to Congressional legislation. (This
situation does not exist today.) Congress ought to proceed with
caution here, because as the Committee has said:
The great difficulty with area restrictions is that they are
self-defeating in too many instances. It becomes a close question,
too often, whether the real penalty is imposed upon the foreign
government which is the target of the area prohibition or upon
the people of this country, both those who choose to stay at home
and those who desire to travel abroad. Those who remain at
home through choice are denied information from their fellow
citizens and local news sources about the proscribed country, and
those who wish to travel, but are denied passports to their areas
of choice, are prevented from directly informing themselves
and the associates. 131
The Committee thinks that carte blanche authority for the Secre-
tary of State is necessary. The following are illustrations of instances
129. See statement of Patrick Murphey Malin, Executive Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, in Passport Legislation Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 131-32 (1959).
130. Statement by Senator Humphrey, Jan. 27, 1959, contained in press release
of same date.
131. Freedom To Travel at 42-43. If exceptions are to be made for certain
reporters, the problem of eligibility becomes ticklish. There is also the problem
of whether the breadth of exceptions "should be considered a form of concession
to that country, or whether it should be considered a matter of our own interest
for the benefit of Americans and other people of the world." Id. at 55. See
Barrett, Diplomacy, Press and China, The Sat. Rev., March 9, 1957, p. 22.
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where they view the Secretary as justified in exercising this power:
(1) as a deterrent to aggression-restraint on travel in a particular
country would be similar to an economic embargo; (2) when hostili-
ties are threatened or in force, and the United States desires to bring
pressure to subdue them or avoid involvement; and (3) where a
country is wrongfully holding United States citizens in prison. With
regard to the detention of United States citizens, the Committee urges
that normal diplomatic practices be exhausted "prior to the imposition
of area restraints." The Committee thinks that the Secretary should
be obliged to set forth a statement with reasons for such an imposi-
tion. Provision would also be made for exceptions, and for a hearing
for individuals who are subject to area restraints when other appli-
cants are not subject to them.
The Committee rightfully rejects the idea of a "no protection"
passport. It points out that no right inures to the citizen against his
country. The right is a matter of international law, and thus a nation
could make a claim on behalf of its subject.18 2 A waiver would not
affect this subject, for as Judge Bazelon wrote, "the American who
becomes embroiled with foreign authorities can only request the aid
of his Government; he cannot compel it." 133
The Committee also thinks that dangers in foreign countries
would be multiplied by such a waiver. This, however, is extremely
doubtful in the cold war situation today because such hostile action
against individuals would not be in the interests of Communist
propaganda. Indeed, the Security Officer of the State Department
gave an indication of the Eisenhower Administration's views on this
problem when he said the following of Congressman Porter's petition
to travel:
I am using Mr. Porter as an example, since he has put himself
forward as an example; if he traveled to Red China-inciden-
tally, I am quite certain that the Communist Chinese would
make very certain that nothing happened to him, because it
would be to their propaganda advantage to see that nothing
did ... 134
Senator Fulbright's provision on area restrictions seems to be in
accord with those advocated by the Committee. As previously men-
tioned, he would make the use of a passport in restricted areas a
crime-a provision that does not today exist. 85 This is a reform
also proposed by the Committee.
132. 1 Oppenhein, International Law § 319 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
133. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
134. Brief for Petitioner, p. 23, Porter v. Herter, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
135. Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1-40 (1952), does not seem to have ever contemplated the regulation of travel
passports.
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The Fulbright bill would permit the Presidential travel ban to
last for one year rather than for an indefinite period. The Humphrey
bill would give the President the power to stay travel anywhere
during war, and to designate combat areas where the United States
is engaged in military hostilities, but war has not been declared. No
other travel bans could be imposed, but the President could inform
the public and Congress of certain areas where this nation could not
protect its citizens. The Wiley bill is silent on this subject.
President Kennedy has indicated that a substantial revision of the
China policy may soon be in order. He favors "a more liberal policy
of granting passports to journalists" to visit Communist China, and
in a speech on June 14, 1960, he stated that we must work to improve
our communications with mainland China, and that if these contacts
prove fruitful, "further cultural and economic contact could be
tried."'13 Thus, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a substan-
tial portion of the problem with regard to travel in China may be
rendered moot shortly. On the other hand, it might be reasonable to
assume continuing problems in this specific area.237 Perhaps this
whole question will be controversial for some time to come, if not in
China, then in other Communist controlled nations. It is, therefore,
important to articulate a demarcation line for Presidential discretion
which is as sharp as possible.
The provisions of the Humphrey bill dealing with war and combat
area restrictions are absolutely necessary to the orderly conduct of
Executive affairs. The "no protection" passport idea should be
discarded in accordance with the reasons stated by the Committee.
The President should have some discretion beyond the Humphrey
bill which would allow him to close off areas where imminent hostil-
ities, in his opinion, might involve this country; or where a clear
pattern of violence against American citizens endangers the conduct
of foreign affairs. He should set forth his findings in the most
detailed manner possible. This requirement should, however, be
consistent with the requirements of national security imposed by this
imminent danger. The time limit should be from six months to a year.
If the President should wish to prohibit travel in a country that he
wishes to punish for a wrong such as aggression or the imprisonment
of American citizens, he should be required to go to Congress for
specific authorization. If this procedure is followed, Executive whim
136. Communication from Senator Kennedy to the author, Oct. 11, 1960.
137. Communist China appears to be hostile to overtures by the Kennedy
administration thus far. See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1961, p. 1, col. 1, wherein the
following is written: "It was reported by diplomatic sources that in a talk with
the United States Ambassador in Warsaw yesterday the envoy from Peiping
refused to negotiate an exchange of news correspondents...."
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with regard to the morals and decency of a certain country may be
kept to a minimum. A quarantine would be subject to examination
through debates and hearings, and a greater rule of reason might
prevail.
J. General Requirement to Hold a Passport
Senator Wiley would leave existing law unchanged. Senator
Fulbright would continue the passport requirement, subject to general
exceptions made by the President, into periods of "normalcy." His
bill also closes loopholes with respect to the requirement of passports
for United States citizens living in other countries in the Western
Hemisphere. An individual going from Mexico to Europe without a
passport would be in violation of the law. The right to travel in
other countries in the Western Hemisphere would continue. The
President would be directed to use, to the extent possible, his power
to make general exceptions to the prohibition of travel without a
passport so that citizens may soon travel without passports to
countries outside the Western Hemisphere.
The Humphrey bill repeals existing law and sanctions travelling
abroad without a passport. A passport would still be important to
citizens, however, since most countries require it as a condition of
entry,13 8 and since it is ready proof of United States citizenship.
CONCLUSION
President Kennedy, in advocating a liberal version of the right to
travel, has indicated that he will support legislation along the lines
of the Fulbright and Humphrey bills.231 This is in accord with the
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the
United States is a signatory, and which states, "everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own. ... "140
The liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are, of course, in
continual competition with the dictates of national security. But we
must always remember that these broad prohibitions may only recede
in the face of the gravest immediate dangers. The Founding Fathers
knew full well the many risks involved in placing their faith in the
individual. In doing so, they rejected a philosophy which would
assume the stooping posture of fear. It is in this tradition that the
Supreme Court acted in Kent v. Dules. It is to be hoped that Congress
will follow suit and simultaneously stake out a positive policy en-
couraging human understanding in a world that is severely troubled.
138. A survey is reported in Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Consti-
tutional Issues and Judicial Reviews, 61 Yale L.J. 171, m.3 (1952).
139. Communication from Senator Kennedy to the author, Oct. 11, 1960.
140. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 13 (2), 19 Dep't State Bull.
753 (1948).
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